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SUPERADDITIVITY 
IN GENERAL FUZZY COALITION GAMES1 
M I L A N M A R E S 
The superadditivity and related concepts belong to the fundamental ones in the coalition 
game theory. Their definition in general coalition games (games without side-payments) 
is based on the set theoretical approaches. It means that in the case of fuzzy coalition 
games the set theoretical model can be modified into the fuzzy set theoretical one. In 
this paper, the coalition games without side-payments and with fuzzy expectations of the 
pay-offs of players are considered and it is shown that for such games the properties of 
superadditivity, subadditivity and additivity turn into fuzzy properties. Their relations to 
their deterministic counterparts are shown and some results regarding their formal structure 
are derived. 
1 . I N T R O D U C T I O N 
The classical deterministic coalition game theory is based on a hidden presumption 
that each player and each coalition know, at the very beginning of negotiations, 
the exact values of payoffs. This assumption does not reflect the reality of practical 
cooperative games and decision-making. In real situations, the expectations of profit 
are always more or less vague, and they can be represented by fuzzy set theoretical 
tools as shown, e. g., in [8]. This approach to the fuzzy coalition games is focused to 
the fuzzification of the characteristic function of the game and differs from the one 
used in [1]. 
Obviously, the fuzzification of the input da ta of the bargaining leads to the fuzzifi-
cation of other properties and objects like the superadditivity, core, etc., as discussed 
in [8] and some other papers. 
The superaddit ivity and related properties (subadditivity, additivity) in fuzzy 
coalition games were briefly viewed in [7] and for the case of coalition games with 
side-payments they were in a more detailed way investigated in [6]. This paper, 
in certain sense, continues [6] and develops the investigation of superadditivity and 
related concepts s tar ted in [7] for coalition games without side-payments or (in 
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Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic Key project No. K1075601, by the Grant Agency of the 
Czech Republic projects No. 402/96/0414 and 402/99/0032, Grant Agency of the Academy of Sci-
ences project No. A1075905 and the Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports project No. VS 96063. 
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another terminology) general coalition games. The main attention is paid to the 
relations between the validity of superadditivity, subadditivity and additivity in 
deterministic coalition games and their fuzzy extensions. 
As the side-payments are not considered, the fuzzification of the game regards 
the sets of admissible pay-off vectors (imputations) and the superadditivity is de-
fined analogously to the deterministic case [3] by means of set theoretical relations 
between these sets. This set-theoretical approach demands another introduction of 
the fuzziness into the superadditivity concept, different from the one used in [6] for 
the games with side-payments. Both concepts of fuzzy superadditivity are compared 
in the conclusive section. 
2. GENERAL COALITION GAME AND ITS SUPERADDITIVITY 
Let us briefly remember the deterministic game theoretical concepts which are to be 
fuzzified in the following sections. 
A general coalition game (or a coalition game without side-payments) is the pair 
(I,V) where I is the (non-empty and finite) set of players, every subset K C I is 
called a coalition. V is a mapping of the class of coalitions in the class of subsets of 
the multidimensional real space I27, such that for any K C I 
— V(K) is closed, 
— if x = (xi)iej G V(A'), y = (yi)iei € R
1 and Xi > yi for all i G K, then 
vev(ff), 
— V(K) + 0, 
— V(K) = R} if and only if K = 0. 
The mapping V is called characteristic function of the game (I, V) and every vector 
x G R1 is an imputation. 
If x, y G R1 and K C I then we say that x dominates y via K and write 
x douiK y iff 
— %i > yi for all i G K} 
— xj > Vj for at least one j G K. 
Then we can define for every coalition K C I its superoptimum set V*(K) by 
V*(K) = < y G R1 : there does not exist x G V(A') such that x dom^ y > 
= {v e R1 : for any x G V(K) either x{ < y{ (1) 
for some i G K or Xj = yj for all j G K>. 
Introducing the concept of superoptimum we have gathered all tools necessary for 
the definition of superadditivity and related concepts. 
We say that the coalition game (I, V) is superadditive if for any pair of disjoint 
coalitions K, L C I, K C\ L = 0, the inclusion 
V(KUL)DV(K)nV(L) (2) 
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is fulfilled. Analogously, we say that the coalition game (I, V) is subadditive iff for 
any pair of disjoint coalitions A', LCI 
V*(KUL)DV*(K)nV*(L). (3) 
We say that (I, V) is additive iff it is superadditive and subadditive. It is not difficult 
to verify (see [3]) that if for any disjoint K, LCI 
V*(KUL)C V*(K)f)V*(L) 
then the game (I, V) is superadditive and, on the other hand, if for any disjoint 
A, L C I 
V(K U L) C V(K) n V(L) 
then the game is subadditive. 
3. FUZZY EXTENSION OF A GAME ' 
If (I, V) is a general coalition game then the sets V(A'), for K C I, describe the 
possible vectors of individual pay-offs of members of coalition K. In the classical 
coalition games model these sets are deterministic and this determinism reflects the 
hidden assumption that the information about the possible outcomes is perfectly 
known at the very beginning of the negotiation. The real bargaining situations are 
different. Some of the imputations are only possible but not certainly achievable 
results of the cooperative behaviour. If we assume that the sets V(A') contain cer-
tainly achievable imputations of coalition K then the set V(Ar) can be extended into 
a fuzzy subset W(K) of R1 by adding only possible but not guaranteed outcomes. 
We say that (I, W) is a fuzzy extension of (I, V) iff I is the set of players and >V 
is a mapping connecting every coalition K with a fuzzy subset W(K) of R1 with 
membership function HK such that (cf. [7]) 
if as CV(K) then /iK(x) = 1, 
the set {x G R1 : ^K(X) = 1} is closed, 
if x, y G I?7, Xi > yi for all i G K, then HK(&) < fJ>K(y), 
if K T-- 0 then there exists x G R1 such that 
pK(x) = 0, 
if K = 0 then ^(x) = 1 for all x G R1. 
The mapping W is called fuzzy characteristic function of (I, W). 
It is rational to consider the domination relation via a coalition to be rather 
dependent on the possibilities of achievability of the input vectors. Namely, if the 
domination relation is to be considered then we demand the dominating imputation 
to be at least as possible (for the relevant coalition) as the dominated one. Then 
the possibility of the validity of domination relation is equal to the possibility of 
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the dominating vector, i.e., the possibility that a pair of imputations fulfilling the 
relation is achievable for the given coalition. In symbols, if as, y £ R1, K C 7, then 
we say that x significantly dominates y via K iff x dom^ y in the sense defined 
above and P>K(X) > l*K(y)> If x dom# y then the possibility that the domination is 
significant is equal to HK(X) iff HK(X) > fJ>K(y) and it is equal to 0 iff the opposite 
inequality /J>K(X) < ^K(y) 1s fulfilled (cf. [8]). We denote this possibility by 
vK(x,y) = HK(X) iff VK(X)> VK(y) and xdomKy> (4) 
= 0 in other cases. 
R e m a r k 1. The definition of W(K) implies that if a; dom/^ y then HK(y) > ^K(X) 
and, consequently, if the domination is significant then HK(X) = HK(y)> 
Having introduced the concept of significant domination, we can define the fuzzy 
superoptimum of the coalition K as a fuzzy subset W*(K) of R1 with membership 
function fj,*K : R
1 —• [0,1]. Intuitively, W*(K) is to be a set of imputations from 
R1 which are not significantly dominated by any imputation from W(K)) and, in 
the terminology of fuzzy sets and possibilities, the possibility that y £ R1 is an 
element of W*(K) is complementary to the possibility that some x £ R1 significantly 
dominating y via K belongs to W(K). It means, in formal expression, that 
ЏK(У) = ^- S U P ^ к ( ж , y ) = inf ( 1 - vк(x,y)). 
XЄR1 XЄR1 
(5) 
R e m a r k 2. If HK(X) strictly decreases in some coordinates i £ K for x ^ V(K) 
and for HK(X) ^ 0, where (/, W) is a fuzzy extension of (7, V), then W*(K) is a 
crisp subset of R1 and W*(K) = V*(K). 
R e m a r k 3. If (7, W) is a fuzzy extension of (7, V) then for every K C 7, the 
inclusion V*(K) D W*(K) in the fuzzy set theoretical sense, i.e., fi*K(x) = 0 for 
x^ V*(K), holds. 
4. SUPERADDITIVITY OF FUZZY EXTENSIONS 
The concept of superadditivity in fuzzy coalition games can be approached in qual-
itatively different ways. The simplest one is a direct analogy of the deterministic 
model (2). 
If (7, W) is a fuzzy extension of a coalition game (7, V) then we say that (7, W) 
is superadditive iff for every pair of disjoint coalitions 7l", L C 7, K D L = 0, 
W(K O L) D W(K) O W(L), (6) 
it means, for any x £ R 
VKUL(X) > min (IXK(X), VL(X)) . (7) 
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Due to this definition, the superadditivity in fuzzy coalition game is presented as 
a deterministic property - relations (6) or (7) are either true or false. This fact rather 
contradicts our presumption that characteristic properties of fuzzy coalition game, 
like its superadditivity, would be also fuzzy. Anyhow, even the simple model intro-
duced above gains some interesting properties. Some of them are already mentioned 
in [7]. 
Theorem 1. Let (I, V) be a coalition game and (I, W) its fuzzy extension such 
that IIK(X) = 1 if and only if x G V(K) for all II" C I. If (I, W) is superadditive in 
the sense of (6) then (I, V) is superadditive in the sense of (2). 
P roo f . The theorem follows from (2), (6) and from the condition that ^K(X) = 1 
exactly for x G V(K). If (I, W) is superadditive then for all x £ V(Ar)fl V(L), where 
K, FcI, # n L = 0, 
VKUL(X) = min(/itf(aj), /iL(a)) = 1 
and, consequently, V(K U L) D V(K) D V(L). • 
Theorem 2. If (I, V) is a coalition game then there exists its fuzzy extension 
(I, W) which is superadditive. 
P roo f . If (I, V) is given then we can define for every one-element coalition 
{«}, i G I, W({i}) and /i{t-j arbitrarily, respecting }J,{Q(X) = 1 for x £ V({i})« 
Then for every two-element coalition {i,j} we define 
V{i,j}(x) = m a x(X{ i , i}(a ;))m i n(/ i{i}(a ;) ) t*{j}(
x))) 
where X{i j} is the characteristic function of V({i, j}), i.e. X{i j}(x) ^ 1 for # G 
V{{i,j}),'x{ij}(x) = Oioix^V({i,j}). ' • 
We can continue in the recursive procedure and for any coalition K C I of at 
least 3 players define 
HK(X) = max(xK(a;), *PK(X)) 
where for any x G R1 
I/>K(X) = max[min(/iL(a;), VK-L(X)) \LO_K,$±L± K] 
and XK is the 0 — 1 characteristic function of V(A'). The fuzzy game (I, W) with 
membership functions ^K constructed in this way is evidently a fuzzy extension of 
(I, V) as for any K C I, x G V(K) means //#(#) = 1 and it is superadditive as for 
any pair of disjoint coalitions K, L 
VKUL(X) > min (^K(X), HL(X)) , x G R1. 
Corollary. If (I, V) is a superadditive coalition game then there exists its fuzzy 
extension (I, W) such that for any K C I, ^K(X) = 1 if and only if x G V(K), 
which is superadditive. The statement is evidently fulfilled by any (I, W) such that 
for each a G (0,1] the functions /i# («) = min(a, V>K(X)) fulfil the superadditivity 
condition / 4 a i z » ^ ™<&\*)> ti\*)) for a*y d i s J o i n t *> L ^ L 
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L e m m a 1. Let (/, V) be a coalition game and let (/, W) and (/, W) be its fuzzy 
extensions. Then also the pairs (/, [W U W']) and (/, [W n W']), where for any 
K C / [W U W] (K) = W(K) U W(K) and [W n W'] (K) = W(K) f) W(K\ are 
fuzzy extensions of (/, V). 
P r o o f . It is not difficult to verify the properties of fuzzy extension for (/, [WU 
W']) and (/, [W H W]). Let us denote the membership functions of [W U W] and 
[wnW], 
/ 4 ( z ) = max(iiK(x), HK(X)) > ^
+ 0*0 = min(jiir(aO, / 4 ( a ) ) , 
respectively, for K C / , x & R1, and /i#, i ^ being membership functions of 
W(K), W(K), respectively. Then for x G V(K), K C / , ^(x) = ^(x) = 1, 
the sets {x E R1 : ̂ (x) = 1} = {x G /?7 : /i^(aj) = 1} U {> G R1 : /4(-c) = 1}, 
{z G /?7 : / i j+fa) = 1} = {x G R1 : /i/c(*) = 1} n {a G tf7 : / i^(«) = 1} are 
closed. If x G /27, y E U ; , -c* > y; for all i G A', then ^(x) < ^(y) and 
/ i^+ (x) < fiK^(y). If we denote by a^
1) and a?(2) the vectors for which /J>K(X^) = 0 
and /i'j<-(-C^) = 0 then ^K(X) = 0 for all x £ R1 such that â - > xj ' for all i G K, 
and ^K(X) — 0 f° r a ^ x £ R1 such that #; > £; ^ for all i G AT. It means that there 
exists y G R1 such that y; > max(x\ \x\ ' ) , z G K, and for this y both, fi\(y) = 0 
and HK+(y) = 0. 
Theorem 3. Let (/, V) be a coalition game, (/, W), (/, W) be its fuzzy extensions 
and (/, [W n W']) fulfils the assumptions of the previous Lemma. If (/, W) and 
(/, W) are superadditive then also (/, [W n W']) is superadditive. 
P r o o f . Let us preserve the notations used in the proof of Lemma 1. If for all 
x G R1 and K, Lcl, K n L = 0, 
HKUL(X) > mm(iiK(x)) HL(X)) , / i U l
3 5 ) > min(/i'K(x), /4(aj)) (8) 
then 
min([iKuL(x), VKUL(X)) > min[min(/i/r(a;), /i^(aj)),min(/iL(x), ^L(x))] 
and, consequently, (/, [IlVflW']) is superadditive. D 
5. FUZZY SUPERADDITIVITY 
The concept of superadditivity presented in the previous section and based on rela-
tions (6) and (7) does not fully reflect the general paradigm of the fuzzy coalition 
games, namely, the presumption that the properties of fuzzy games are to be also 
fuzzy. The superadditivity defined by (6) is a completely deterministic concept - a 
fuzzy extension (/, W) of some game (/, V) either is superadditive or it is not. If 
we want to implement vagueness also into the superadditivity of fuzzy extensions 
of coalition games, we can apply the approach suggested already in [7], namely, we 
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can use the concept of a-cuts of fuzzy sets to structurize the possibilities of the 
superadditivity. / 
Let (I, V) be a coalition game and (I, W) be its fuzzy extension. Let a G (0,1] 
be real number, and let us define for every coalition K C I a fuzzy subset Wa(K) 
of R1 with membership function jr^ : R1 —• [0, a] such that 
^K\X) = min(a, HK(X)), a G I27. 
Then we say that the pair (I, Wa) is an a-reduction of (I, W), and we say that 
(I, W) is a-fuzzy super additive iff for any A', LCI, If H L = 0, 
Wa(tf U L) D Wa(K) H W„(L) (9) 
it means 
Ai&r>) > m ^ *€« . (10) 
Remark 4. If (I, W) is a fuzzy extension of (I, V), if 0 < a < f3 < 1 and if (I, W) 
is /?-fuzzy superadditive then it is a-fuzzy superadditive. Consequently, if (I, W) 
is fuzzy superadditive in the sense of (6) then it is a-fuzzy superadditive for any 
a G ( 0 , l ] . 
The concepts introduced above allow us to define the possibility with which (I, W) 
is superadditive as a number 
cr(I, W) = sup (a G (0,1] : (I, W) is a-fuzzy superadditive). (11) 
Obviously, cr(I. W) = 0 if (I, W) is not a-fuzzy superadditive for any a > 0. 
Of course, fuzzy superadditivity (6) is identical with 1-fuzzy superadditivity, 
<r(I, W) = 1. The previous notes and Theorem 1 mean that equality a(I,W) = 1 
implies the superadditivity of the deterministic game (I, V) if HK(X) = 1 exactly for 
x G V(A'), for all K C I. 
Lemma 2. If (I, W) is a fuzzy extension of (I, V) and if f3 G (0,1], then <r(I, W) = 
/? if and only if 
/? = sup (a G (0,1] : (I, W) is a-superadditive). 
P r o o f . If (I, W) is a-superadditive then, due to Remark 4, it is 7-superadditive 
for all 0 < 7 < a and (11) can be reduced in correspondence with the statement of 
Lemma. D 
The previous result about the existence of superadditive fuzzy extension (see 
Theorem 2) can be extended to the case of a-fuzzy superadditivity and to arbitrary 
value of the possibility a(I, W) . 
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Theorem 4. Let (I, V) be a coalition game and (3 G (0,1]. Then there exists 
a fuzzy extension (I, W) of (I, V) which is fuzzy superadditive with possibility 
(7(I,W)=/?. 
P r o o f . Let us suppose that there already exists a fuzzy extension (7, W') of (7, V) 
with membership functions /JLK, K C L Then we can construct, for every player 
i G I, the membership functions /i{,} such that fi{i}(x) > n'^(x) for all x G R1 
and, moreover, there exists at least one x £ R1 such that fifj(x) < (3 and /i/a}(a?) = 1 
for all i G L The fuzzy extension (I, W) with these membership functions, certainly 
is not superadditive with possibility /?. Let us put ^K(X) — H'K(X) f° r a-l K C I, 
where K contains at least two players, then we construct the /3-cuts 
fi{P(x) = mm(/3, (mix)), x E R1, K C I 
and use the recursive procedure used in the proof of Theorem 2. Applying it, we 
obtain membership functions fiK, K C I, where K contains at least two players. 
Applying it, we obtain membership functions /i*^, K C I, such that for all i G I 
/*{,-}(*) = /? i f 0 < / i { O ( ^ ) < / 3 , 
= /*{,•}(#) if fi{i}(x)>/3J 
= 0 if / / { O - 0 
for all i, j G I, i < j , 
li'li}(x) = max ( ^ ^ ( a J j i m n ^ j C a j ) , ^'{i}(x))j 
and, generally, for i£ C I, -f-T containing more than 3 players 
I*K(X) = max(/i/r(a:), I/>K(X)) 
where 
</%(*) = max (mm(/i£(s), HK-L(X)) ' L C K ^ ^ L ^ K) . 
Then the pair (I, W") where for any I\~ C I, W^IY) are fuzzy subsets of R1 with 
membership functions fiK, is a fuzzy extension of (I, V) and it is fuzzy superadditive 
with possibility a(I, W") = 0. • 
6. SUBADDITIVITY AND ADDITIVITY OF FUZZY EXTENSIONS 
If (J, V) is a deterministic coalition game and (J, W) its fuzzy extension then it 
appears natural to define the subadditivity of (/, W) by means of the (fuzzy) sets 
W*(K), K C / , with membership functions fiK defined by (5). Remarks 2 and 3 
illustrate that for any K C I the set W*(K) is not a fuzzy extension of V*(A') 
but, generally, its reduction. It significantly changes the relation between fuzzy 
and deterministic subadditivity (and, consequently, additivity) in coalition games. 
Remarks 2 and 3 can be completed by the following statement. 
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Lemma 3. Let (I, W) be a fuzzy extension of (I, V) such that for any coalition 
K C I and any x G R1 > HK(X) = 1 if and only if x G V(I\). Then n*K(x) = 1 for 
all x G V(K) n V*(IQ, where fiK is the membership function of W*(K). 
P r o o f . If x G V(K) n V*(K) and fi(y) < 1 for all y G R1 such that y domjc x 
then, due to (5) and due to the definition of significant domination, x cannot be 
significantly dominated by any y G R1 via K and fJ>*K(x) = 1. • 
If (I, W) is a fuzzy extension of (I, V) then we say that (I, W) is subadditive iff 
for any K, L C I, K n L = 0, 
W*(Ii UL)D W*(K) n W*(L) (12) 
it means 
VKUL(X) > min(^(a5), 140*0), for all a; G R1. (13) 
Remark 5. Obviously, Remark 2 implies that if (I, V) is subadditive then there 
exists its subadditive extension and, for all K C I, if HK(X) strictly decreases in 
some coordinates for x $_ V(Iir) then (I, W) is subadditive if and only if (I, V) is 
subadditive. 
Analogously to the case of superadditivity, it is possible to construct a subadditive 
extension of any deterministic coalition game (I, V) but, as follows from Remark 5, 
it does not fulfil the condition HK(X) = 1 iff as G V(K) for some K C I. 
Theorem 5. If (I, V) is coalition game then there exists its fuzzy extension (I, W) 
which is subadditive. 
P r o o f . The statement is quite obvious if we remember Remark 5. It is sufficient 
to construct new deterministic game (I, Vn) which is subadditive and such that for 
any K C I, Vo(A') D V(K). Such construction is always possible. Let us put, for 
example, Vn(I) = V(I) and for any K C I, K ^ I, Vn(A') such that for any L D I 
Vo*(X)nVo(L) = 0. 
Then any fuzzy extension (I, W) of (I, Vn) is also a fuzzy extension of (I,V). If 
W(K) are constructed so that (JLK(X) 1s strictly decreasing in some coordinates and 
for those x for which HK(X) G (0,1) from K then W(K) is fuzzy subadditive. • 
The fuzzy additivity can be defined, analogously to the deterministic case, as a 
conjunction of fuzzy superadditivity and fuzzy subadditivity. 
If (I, W) is a fuzzy extension of (I, V) then we say that it is additive iff for any 
pair of disjoint coalitions Ky LCI, K f) L = 0, 
W(K UL)D W(K) n W(L) and W*(K U L) D W*(K) n W*(L) (14) 
which means for all x G R1 
/iKuL(-c) > min(/itf (a;), HL(X)) and ii*KuL(x) > min (^ (a j ) , nl(x)). (15) 
Certain potential complexity of, namely, the fuzzy superoptimum set causes simplic-
ity of achievable results which are similar to those derived for the subadditivity. 
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Theorem 6. Let (I, W) be a fuzzy extension of (I, V) such that for any K C I 
the membership function }JLK(X) strictly decreases for some coordinates from K. If 
(I, W) is additive then (I, V) is additive. 
P r o o f . The statement follows from Theorem 1 and Remark 5. • 
Theo rem 7. If (I, V) is a coalition game then there always exists its additive fuzzy 
extension (I, W). 
P r o o f . The proof is analogous to those ones of Theorem 2 and Theorem 5. It is 
sufficient to construct a new deterministic coalition game (I, Vo) which is additive 
and Vo(A') D V(Ii)vfor all K C I. Such game always exists and it has to fulfil for 
every K C I the conditions 
Vo(A') D D %({«•}), VS(ff) D D V*0({i}) 
i£K i£K 
and 
y G Vo(A') n VQ(K) for y G R1, y«- = max(z2- : x G V0({i})), for all i G I. 
These conditions are necessary (but not sufficient) for the additivity. Fulfilling these 
conditions it is possible to construct the sets V0(A') recursively, where for i, j G 
h i < h 
Vo({iJ})DV0({i})nVo({j}) and V0*({i,j}) D V0*({i}) n V0*({j}) 
and generally 
Vo(K)D (J (V0(L)nV0(K-L)), V*0(K) D [j (V*0(L)nV*0(K - L)). 
LCK LCK 
t±L±K t±L±K 
The desired fuzzy extension is, for example, the game (I, Vo) itself but there exist 
also other fuzzy extensions (I, W) of (I, Vo) such that for any K C I, V-K(K) = 1 iff 
x G Vo(A'), A*K(-C) is strictly decreasing for some coordinates from K and for x for 
which 1 > HK(K) > 0, and the inclusion 
W(K \JL)D W(K) n W(L) 
is fulfilled for any pair of disjoint coalitions. • 
7. FUZZY SUPERADDITIVITY IN LINEAR GAMES 
The general coalition games may in some cases gain a special form called coalition 
games with side-payments (cf., for example, [7, 10]). Such games are defined as pairs 
(I, v) where I is the set of players and v : 27 —> R is a mapping connecting each 
coalition K C I with a real number v(K) G I2, v(0) = 0. If we construct for every 
coalition K C I a set 
V(K) = lxeRI :y£íxi<v(K)\ (16) 
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then it is easy to verify that the pair (I, V) is a deterministic general coalition 
game in the sense considered in the previous sections. It is also easy to prove (cf. 
[3]) that (I, V) is superadditive if and only if for any pair of disjoint coalitions 
A', LCI, KC)L = ft\, 
v(K U L) > v(K) + v(L) (17) 
and, analogously, it is subadditive and additive iff for any A', LCI, K D L = 0, 
v(K U L) < v(K) + v(L) and v(K U L) = v(K) + v(L), (18) 
respectively. 
As the coalition games with side-payments are defined by means of real-valued 
characteristic function v, it is natural to fuzzify them by means of using fuzzy num-
bers instead of the deterministic values v(K). It was done in [7] and [6] and in 
this section we briefly investigate the relation between both types of results - those 
derived for games with side payments and those presented above for the general 
games. We will see that in the fuzzy case both the approaches are not equivalent. 
Before remembering the results summarized in [6] it is necessary to introduce 
several elementary concepts of the theory of fuzzy quantities [4, 5]. Fuzzy quantity 
is any fuzzy subset a of the real line R with membership function /ia : R —» [0,1] 
such that 
— there exists xa G R for which fia(xa) = 1, 
— there exist x\, X2 G R) x\ < #2, where /ia(#) = 0 for all x £ [zi-a^]-
The algebraic operations with fuzzy quantities can be defined by means of so called 
extension principle. For our purpose, we need the concept of sum of fuzzy quantities 
a and 6 defined as a fuzzy quantity a © 6 with membership function 
/ i a 0 6(x) = sup [min(/ia(y), fib(x - y))], x G R. (19) 
yeR 
Moreover, the investigation of superadditivity demands also the ordering relation 
over fuzzy quantities. There exist many different definitions of such relation. In this 
paper we use, in accordance with [6, 7, 8] the one based on the idea that ordering 
relation over vague fuzzy quantities is also a vague fuzzy relation valid with some 
possibility. If a, b are fuzzy quantities then we say that a )z b with possibility 
ZA (a, 6) iff 
vy (a, 6) = sup [min(/ia(x), \i\>(y))]. (20) 
~ x.y€J* 
x > y 
The basic properties of this ordering relation ate discussed, e.g., in [5]. 
Having mentioned some concepts of the fuzzy quantities theory we can remem-
ber the fuzzification of coalition game with side-payments (I, v) with characteristic 
function v : 27 —> IZ, as suggested in [6, 7]. 
We say that a pair (I, w) is a fuzzy extension of a coalition game with side-
payments (I, v) if for every coalition A' C -I, w(K) is a fuzzy quantity with member-
ship function KK such that TTK(V(K)) = 1. Analogously to (17) we say that (I, w) 
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is fuzzy super additive iff for any K, L C I, K C\ L = 0, 
w(Kl)L) >z w(K)®w(L). (21) 
If we abbreviate the notation and introduce the symbol KK+L for the membership 
function of the fuzzy quantity w(K) 0 ut(L), i. e. 
*K+L(X) = sup [mm(fiK(y)) fiL(x - y))], x G R, 
then the possibility of relation (21) is, due to (20), 
v (w(K U L), w(K) © uv(L)) = sup [min(/i/<:uL(z), ^+L(2/))] (22) 
* > y 
and the possibility that (I, w) is fuzzy superadditive will be denoted 
A(I, w) = min(l/fc (uv(A' U L), w(K) 0 t/;(L)) : A, L C I, IC fl L = 0). (23) 
Analogously to the deterministic procedure (16), it is easy to derive also from a 
fuzzy extension (I, w) of coalition game with side-payment (I, v) for every coalition 
K C I the fuzzy subset W(I \) of R1 with membership function \IK • R1 —* [0,1] 
such that for every x G R1 
fiK(x) = sup j Tr/^y) : y G R
1 ^ y i >YlXi)' (24) 
V K K / 
It is easy to see that the pair (I, W) is a fuzzy extension of the general coalition 
game (I, V) where the sets V(K) were derived by (16). Moreover, if for a coalition 
K C I, KK(X) is strictly decreasing for all x > v(K) then also ^K(^) is strictly 
decreasing for all x ^ V(K) and all coordinates from K. 
The results derived in the previous sections imply the following relation between 
the fuzzy superadditivity of both extensions, (I, w) and (I, W). 
Theorem 8. Let (I, v) be a coalition game with side-payments, let (I, w) be its 
fuzzy extension such that for all coalitions K C I the membership function 7TK(X) is 
strictly decreasing for all x > v(K), and let (I, V) and (I, W) be derived from (I, v) 
and (Iyw) by means of (16) and (24), respectively. Let A(I, w) be the possibility 
that (I, w) is fuzzy superadditive in the sense of (21). If (I, W) is superadditive 
in the sense of (6) and (7) then (I, V) is superadditive in the sense of (2), (I, v) is 
superadditive in the sense of (17) and A(I, w) = 1. Moreover, under the assumptions 
of this theorem the following statements are equivalent 
— (I, v) is superadditive due to (17), 
— (I, V) is superadditive due to (2), 
— A(I,tx/) = 1. 
P r o o f . The statement follows from Theorem 1, from the obvious equivalence 
between (17) and (2) (cf. [3]) and from [6], namely its Theorem 3. • 
(Received June 7, 1999.) 
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